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1055 
KNOWING AN “EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION” 
WHEN YOU SEE ONE: APPLYING THE 
COMMERCIALITY APPROACH TO TAX 
EXEMPTIONS FOR UNIVERSITIES  
UNDER § 501(c)(3) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning with the earliest colonial schools, educational institutions 
have had a consistent presence in America, challenging both their 
students’ intellects and the federal government, which must implement 
laws to define and monitor the roles of educational institutions.
1
 As 
colleges and universities have proliferated, particularly over the last 
century, they have “changed from small, regionalized educational schools 
to large, government-funded institutions with multi million-dollar budgets 
and endowments.”2 In many cases, these monolithic schools can impact 
how a community functions or governs itself, often by serving as the 
primary interest group or employer in their towns.
3
 Yet, even before the 
colossal growth and expansion of contemporary universities occurred, 
when schools were smaller entities, the federal government recognized the 
 
 
 1. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 704–05 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In 
this case, the Supreme Court outlined a brief history of tax exemptions for universities. Id. at 703–04. 
The Court noted that the issue often presented itself in relation to religious institutions, which even the 
Founding Fathers felt they needed to address. Id. at 704–05. As early as 1784, James Madison 
attempted to pass a bill in Virginia stating that if a tax exemption could not be used for churches, it 
should be used in support of the state’s educational institutions. Id.; see also John D. Colombo, Why Is 
Harvard Tax-Exempt? (and Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 
35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841 (1993). 
 2. John M. Bello, Note, Economics 101: A Study of the Tax-Exempt Status of Colleges and 
Universities, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 615, 616 (2001). 
 3. See id. at 626. For example, Cornell University has approximately 22,000 enrolled students 
who can find employment locally through the school. CORNELL CAREERS, http://careers.hr.cornell.edu 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9SJ2-ZME7; see also Conducting a Job Search 
in the Ithaca Area, CORNELL CAREERS, https://www.hr.cornell.edu/jobs/ithaca_job_search.html (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2014) (recommending ways for Cornell University students to find local employment). 
Yet, the population of Ithaca, New York, the town where the school is located, has only slightly more 
than 30,000 people located in it. State & County QuickFacts: Ithaca, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3638077.html (last revised July 8, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/K9B4-TTVQ. Thus, because of its presence as the local supermajority, Cornell 
University functions as both the biggest interest group, impacting how the town governs itself, as well 
as the largest supplier of labor, given its large student body, in the Ithaca community.  
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value of higher education
4
 and sought to support it with the hope of 
encouraging academic endeavors within the populace.
5
  
Over time, these efforts culminated in the creation of Internal Revenue 
Code § 501(c)(3),
6
 which outlines the parameters for determining tax 
exemptions for non-profit organizations, including educational 
institutions.
7
 Given the tremendous size and scope of contemporary 
universities, however, this statute appears to be overly generous in its 
applications and definitions.
8
 Colleges, in an increasing number of facets, 
are beginning to more closely resemble businesses than educational 
entities driven solely by academic pursuits.
9
 As a result, numerous 
 
 
 4. See Colombo, supra note 1, at 844. Because many of the first universities in America—such 
as Yale, Dartmouth, Brown, and William & Mary—began as “quasi-public” schools, the colonies had 
an interest in expanding these institutions to educate their citizens because they existed for the 
enhancement of their populaces. Id. at 845. Thus, for example, some colonies “extended local tax 
exemption to the professors who taught in colleges or universities as well as their students” to 
encourage involvement and participation from community thought leaders and academics. Id. at 844. 
This trend has become engrained in the American approach to educational institutions to the point 
where today “virtually every state has either a constitutional or statutory provision exempting 
educational institutions from state and local property and income taxes.” Id. at 845. 
 5. The tax exemptions can be “[v]iewed as subsidies,” serving as tacit support from the 
government for the continued existence of these entities. Evelyn Brody, All Charities Are Property-
Tax Exempt, But Some Charities Are More Exempt than Others, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 621, 639 
(2010). The government believed that the use of financial aid would be one of the most expedient 
mechanisms it could offer to help enable the proliferation of educational institutions. See id. 
(explaining that favorable tax treatment can provide additional funds to operate and maintain a 
business or organization); see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 
(1983) (establishing that “[b]oth tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is 
administered through the tax system” because tax exemptions effectively have the same financial 
impact “as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income”). 
Essentially, “insulating educational institutions from the economic burden of taxation would allow 
them to spend more of their revenue on infrastructure and academic pursuits.” Bello, supra note 2, at 
617–18. 
 6. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). Throughout this Note, this legislation will be referred to as 
“§ 501(c)(3).” 
 7. Under this statute, “corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized 
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes” are entitled to tax exemptions from the government. Id. (emphasis added).  
 8. See Bello, supra note 2, at 615–16 (noting the substantial growth in size of universities over 
time). Many scholars argue that universities no longer fit within the confines of the law as it is written 
because of their tremendous size, capabilities, and involvement in their communities. Id. In addition, 
though the legislation applies to “any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational 
purposes,” this note will only address the pertinent concerns regarding tax exemptions for colleges. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 9. Schools are no longer purely educational in nature. Contemporary universities pursue 
pecuniary endeavors in athletics, research, marketing, and multiple other areas. Essentially, 
universities are being unjustly rewarded with tax exemptions for labeling themselves as educational 
institutes when in fact they are more akin to multi-million (or even multi-billion) dollar corporations 
that compete in the various markets as any other company would. See Oksana Koltko, Chasing 
Profits—Disregarding Values: Legal Persona of Elite Schools and Their Destructive Tax-Exempt 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/9
  
 
 
 
 
2015] EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1057 
 
 
 
 
frameworks have been created for determining whether an educational 
institution is actually educational in nature because the line between a 
business and a school has been blurred.
10
 Essentially, modern universities 
have evolved to the point where they can no longer be considered purely 
educational institutions as defined by federal law. Instead, as they exist 
today, universities function more like businesses, which should preclude 
them from receiving the tax exemptions that the government affords to 
charitable institutions. 
This Note will examine the appropriateness of allowing tax exemptions 
for educational institutions to universities and argue that modern colleges 
have begun to more resemble businesses rather than schools given their 
tremendous scope, size, and profit-making capabilities. Part II provides a 
historical survey and genesis of tax exemption legislation to understand 
the basic principles, justifications, and goals behind the creation of these 
laws. Part III outlines four frameworks that have been created to determine 
if an entity, specifically a university, is an educational institution. This 
Part will enumerate multiple components and criteria that are used to 
evaluate organizations, concluding that the use of quantifiable 
measurements under the commerciality approach makes it the most useful 
and appropriate framework for the government to employ. Part IV 
analyzes the applicability of using the commerciality approach by 
demonstrating the multiple profitable business ventures that contemporary 
universities are involved in. Finally, Part V offers comprehensive 
proposals for adopting the commerciality approach and addresses 
problems that may arise during their implementation.  
II. BACKGROUND 
The concept of university tax exemption precedes American history, 
dating back to medieval Europe.
11
 Though colleges were originally “no 
more than relatively spontaneous, informal, and unstructured associations 
of teachers and students who combined into communities . . . analogous to 
 
 
Status, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2009). Furthermore, there is only limited legislative 
history available “to provide guidance in delineating the precise intended scope and limits” of what 
even defines an educational institution. Lynn Lu, Flunking the Methodology Test: A Flawed Tax-
Exemption Standard for Educational Organizations That “Advocate[] a Particular Position or 
Viewpoint”, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 377, 380 (2004). This ambiguity enables many 
institutions to unjustly enrich themselves under the facade of academia. 
 10. Colombo, supra note 1, at 848–57. 
 11. The idea of a university providing education and knowledge to students has been present for 
centuries. Id. at 844–45; see also John A. Beach, The Management and Governance of Academic 
Institutions, 12 J.C. & U.L. 301, 309–10 (1985). 
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the trade guilds,” their positive contributions to society gained significant 
appreciation and recognition over time.
12
 For example, in the Preamble to 
the Statute of Charitable Uses Act of 1601, which enumerates purposes 
and activities that the British Crown believed were beneficial to society 
and deserving of private contributions, “Schooles of Learninge, Free 
Schooles and Schollers in Univsities”13 are included, demonstrating that 
the English government understood the importance of educating the 
populace and wanted to foster the growth of the developing concept of a 
university.
14
 Consequently, the English government, as well as other 
governments throughout Europe,
15
 recognized that the expansion of these 
institutions could be expediently accomplished by offering them tax 
exemptions.
16
 By being free of the requirement to contribute to the 
government’s maintenance via taxation, the universities could instead use 
the money for the education of students.
17
 
The United States, on the other hand, would not codify tax exemptions 
for schools in federal law
18
 until centuries later in 1894, when Congress 
passed the first corporate income tax law.
19
 This legislation contained a 
broad exemption for “corporations, companies, or associations organized 
and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes.”20 
Furthermore, it appears that this segment of the law pertaining to tax 
 
 
 12. Beach, supra note 11, at 304. 
 13. The Statute of Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (Eng.). Though educational 
institutions were featured on this list, other places, such as orphanages and churches, were also 
included in the legislation. It was intended to serve as a guideline for what the Crown considered to be 
important. This list has developed and grown further through English case law over the last few 
centuries to formally define the parameters of which entities and organizations qualify for tax 
exemptions. Id. 
 14. Universities had unofficially existed in the United Kingdom long before this statute was 
passed. Beach, supra note 11, at 309. Students and teachers from all over the world would congregate 
together to study and teach different subjects. For example, the University of Oxford can trace its 
origins back to the dynasty of King John in the late 12th century; however, the government did not 
officially charter it as a corporate entity until 1570 during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. Id. 
 15. Universities were not only operating in England during this time period. Similar institutions, 
such as the University of Toulouse (France), University of Bologna (Italy), and Trinity College 
(Ireland), were concurrently holding classes and teaching students. Id. at 305 n.23. 
 16. Id. at 314 (explaining that tax exemptions provide “freedom from the burden of enforced 
contribution to the expenses and maintenance of government,” which gives the institution additional 
money to use for its own purposes).  
 17. Id. 
 18. State property tax exemptions for schools and churches had existed before the federal law 
was enacted. Koltko, supra note 9, at 1089.  
 19. See Details of the Income Tax: The Internal Revenue Bill as Finally Completed, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 1894, at 3 (reporting the passage of a new law that imposed a tax on the income of 
corporations as well as individuals). 
 20. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894); see also Colombo, supra note 1, at 
845. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/9
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exemption was passed without much controversy or debate, emphasizing 
the universality of its congressional approval.
21
 At the time, this law was 
predominantly viewed as confirmation of the framework of university tax 
exemptions that had already been in place “at the state and local level” of 
government.
22
 
Since then, Congress has continued down the path of exemptions for 
universities, utilizing its powers under the Taxing Clause
23
 and enabling 
the proliferation of legislation that gives tax benefits to universities.
24
 
Initially, educational activities that fell within tax-exempt status were 
loosely defined and widely applicable, such that assorted broad or eclectic 
academic pursuits would be included within the law.
25
 This extremely 
generous labeling, however, has been significantly modified and narrowed 
over time.
26
 In particular, one of the most important landmarks in the 
genesis of tax exemptions was § 501(c)(3),
27
 which was “introduced in its 
current form in 1954.”28 This law has been the paradigmatic piece of 
legislation for guiding the government’s allowance of university tax 
exemptions, outlining the contours and requirements that institutions must 
meet to qualify for these benefits.
29
 Yet, even with the guidelines it 
 
 
 21. See Colombo, supra note 1, at 845. The 1894 law would ultimately be deemed 
unconstitutional one year later, but now all subsequent federal income tax legislation offers a similar 
exemption for educational institutions. Id. 
 22. Id. By the late 19th century, many states had recognized the value of providing tax 
exemptions to nonprofit organizations, which included universities. State and local governments 
recognized the value that these organizations could bring to their communities, and many 
commentators believe that the first federal tax exemptions were therefore simply mimicking this 
recognition of schools’ contributions to society. Id. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . .”). Essentially, this clause grants the federal government the ability to 
levy taxes to raise revenue for itself; however, this power has since been expanded through Supreme 
Court jurisprudence to include regulatory, prohibitive, and protectionist taxes (and tariffs). See, e.g., 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). The extensive power and judicial history of the Taxing 
Clause will not be further discussed in this Note though as it is outside the scope of the issue of tax 
exemptions for educational institutions.  
 24. See Lu, supra note 9, at 377–79 (discussing congressional ability to grant tax exemptions). 
 25. In the 1920s, there was an extremely expansive definition of education. Among other 
endeavors, “the IRS concluded that the educational exemption applied to activities as diverse as 
studying ruffled grouse, maintaining wild bird sanctuaries and forest land, and disseminating 
geographic knowledge.” Colombo, supra note 1, at 846 (citations omitted). Furthermore, some courts 
applauded ambitious citizens striving to learn more about diverse topics and encouraged them to 
follow academic pursuits. See, e.g., State v. Carleton Coll., 191 N.W. 400, 402 (Minn. 1923) (noting 
that citizens’ educational pursuits laid the foundation for substantiating the existence of university tax 
exemptions). 
 26. See Colombo, supra note 1, at 846–47 (introducing the difficulty that defining the term 
“education” has historically presented). 
 27. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 28. Lu, supra note 9, at 385. 
 29. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (2008). According to this regulation, an educational 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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articulates, there is still a tremendous amount of debate surrounding what 
constitutes “education” and who is allowed to claim that they are 
“educating” others via their services.30  
Therefore, Congress has attempted to remedy some of the problems 
caused by the ambiguity with even more legislation.
31
 As a result, unlike 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there is now no longer 
immense, unrestrained freedom in defining what constitutes an educational 
institution because the government recognized the dangers of unchecked 
organizations.
32
 In particular, the government did not want tax-exempt 
groups to gain unfair competitive advantages in the market, which has led 
to the taxation of unrelated business activities.
33
 Essentially, the relevant 
laws establish that charitable organizations that would be “exempt from 
federal income taxation pursuant to Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code are, nevertheless, subject to taxation on income derived from any 
trade or business regularly carried on by them which is unrelated to their 
exempt purposes.”34 This law reflects the congressional desire to allow 
tax-exempt organizations to pursue commercial ventures while limiting 
them with the same competitive restrictions that their tax-paying 
counterparts in the market face.
35
  
For example, when an esteemed tax-exempt scientific organization 
exploits its reputation by selling endorsements of laboratory equipment to 
aid manufacturers, the income derived from that transaction does not 
 
 
institution can be defined by its primary tax-exempt purpose. If “(a) [t]he instruction or training of the 
individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities; or (b) [t]he instruction of the 
public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community,” the entity can argue that it 
should be tax-exempt. Id. Broad examples of organizations that meet these requirements are 
enumerated in the regulation. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii). These entities include traditional 
universities, or other schools, that have “a regularly scheduled curriculum, a regular faculty, and a 
regularly enrolled body of students in attendance at a place where the educational activities are 
regularly carried on” as well as “forums, panels, lectures, or other similar programs” and “[m]useums, 
zoos, planetariums, [and] symphony orchestras.” Id. 
 30. Colombo, supra note 1, at 846.  
 31. See I.R.C. §§ 512–13 (2013). These laws are meant to clarify what education is and they 
have successfully helped eliminate some confusion; however, they have also opened the door to other 
concerns such as distinguishing exempt charitable activities from non-exempt business activities. 
“Specifically, income of non-profit organizations generally is exempt from federal and other income 
taxes, while the for-profit business must pay taxes on the same income from the same type of 
activities.” Rita Marie Cain, Marketing Activities in the Non-Profit Sector—Recent Lessons Regarding 
Tax Implications, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 349, 350 (1999). 
 32. Bello, supra note 2, at 618. 
 33. I.R.C. § 513 (2013). 
 34. Donald C. Haley, The Taxation of the Unrelated Business Activities of Exempt 
Organizations: Where Do We Stand? Where Do We Seem to Be Headed?, 7 AKRON TAX J. 61, 61 
(1990).  
 35. Id. at 61–62. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/9
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“contribute importantly to the accomplishment of” its exempt purpose, 
which is research and development.
36
 Thus, the income derived from the 
endorsement would be taxed as unrelated business income under the law.
37
 
Furthermore, the courts have attempted to support congressional efforts to 
define and maintain these tax exemptions.
38
 “[C]ase law has slowly shifted 
in favor of the taxpayers because courts have begun to scrutinize the 
composition and the operations of exempt institutions,” minimizing the 
ambiguity present in the statutes.
39
 Essentially, courts are attempting to 
resolve loopholes in the tax exemptions afforded to universities to prevent 
systematic abuse.
40
 
Yet, despite the government’s considerable efforts, there is still 
tremendous disagreement regarding the vagueness presented by undefined 
terms in the law.
41
 As a result, scholars have created multiple frameworks 
to aid in the evaluation and definition of an “educational institution”42 that 
can be applied to universities.
43
 
III. STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING § 501(C)(3) 
To qualify as tax-exempt, there are a few basic bureaucratic hurdles 
that an organization must surpass.
44
 Satisfying these conditions is rarely a 
 
 
 36. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) (2013). 
 37. Id. The regulation additionally provides multiple instances that illustrate other qualified tax-
exempt organizations that obtain income related to the purpose of their tax exemption. Id. For 
example, when a tax-exempt performing arts school for children charges admission to a show staged 
by its students, the profit from the tickets does not constitute unrelated business because the 
performance is an essential part of the children’s development as performers. Id. § 1.513-1(d)(4) 
(2013). Thus, the income the school derives from the performance is not taxed because it contributes 
to the dance studio’s recognized tax-exempt purpose: fostering the study and creation of art. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 848–49 (1986) (elaborating 
on the shifting judicial standards, specifically that scrutiny is moving away from educational content 
and toward conduct); State ex rel. Wis. U. Bldg. Corp. v. Bareis, 44 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Wis. 1950) 
(noting the use of tax exemptions "to produce all possible opportunity to those seeking the advantages 
of the university"). 
 39. Bello, supra note 2, at 618. 
 40. Id.; see also Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. v. Comm’r, 732 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(explaining that Congress wanted to limit the inherent unfair competitive advantages given to tax-
exempt entities). 
 41. See generally Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the 
Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 206 (1987) (explaining various concerns presented by ambiguity in the 
law). 
 42. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 43. See generally Koltko, supra note 9, at 1099–1101. 
 44. The basic bureaucratic standards establish that the institution must hold organizing 
documents that limit the entity’s purpose and operations to a charitable function, which includes 
education. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1) (2008); see also Colombo, supra note 1, at 845–46. In 
addition, the entity’s operations must actually pursue that charitable goal while still complying with 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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challenge though, as most entities meet these requirements in the course of 
their daily operations.
45
 Instead, most litigation pertains to having a court 
decide whether an educational institution is barred from a tax exemption 
because its activities are not legitimately educational in practice.
46
 Not 
surprisingly, both the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have had 
trouble creating a definition that can be uniformly applied.
47
 This 
ambiguity has led to the creation of four different frameworks for 
analyzing whether an “educational institution” is eligible for a tax 
exemption.
48
 
A. Inurement/Private Benefit Approach  
The inurement/private benefit standard is a two-part scheme that stems 
from the language “no part of [an educational institution’s] net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual”49 in 
§ 501(c)(3).
50
 The first facet of the test, inurement, has been relatively 
uncontroversial and straightforward because violations of it typically 
involve clear abuse of the benefits derived from the tax exemption.
51
 It 
refers to scenarios where an educational institution’s funds or economic 
benefits are diverted from the class of people the group is supposed to 
help, such as students, and instead used to benefit the organization or its 
leadership and employees.
52
 Tax-exempt entities are not supposed to 
distribute profits to their owners, directors, or anyone with ownership-like 
authority, which this approach recognizes as a disqualifier for tax-exempt 
 
 
limits on political lobbying and campaign activity so it does not demonstrate bias or corrupt its 
charitable purpose. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1); see also I.R.C. § 501(h). 
 45. See generally Brody, supra note 5; Chisolm, supra note 41. Most of the debate surrounding 
tax exemptions pertains to an entity’s scope, charitable activities, or the extent of its unrelated business 
income. The ability to form a charitable organization is rarely contested in the courtroom. Chisolm, 
supra note 41, at 256–61.  
 46. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). For example, tax-exempt organizations can have “no part of [their] net 
earnings [that] inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual” as well as “no substantial 
part of the activities [that] is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation 
. . . on behalf of (or in opposition to)” candidates for public office. Id. 
 47. See Colombo, supra note 1, at 846–48. 
 48. Id. at 848–55. 
 49. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2008); see also Colombo, supra note 1, at 850–51. 
 51. Colombo, supra note 1, at 850. 
 52. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/9
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status.
53
 For example, inadequate rent charged by the entity to an officer of 
the company would constitute inurement.
54
 
The second component of the test, private benefit, is less 
comprehensible.
55
 It refers to “the situation in which an entity’s benefits 
appear to flow primarily to a narrow group, rather than to the general 
community.”56 Essentially, if the class of people that the organization is 
believed to be helping is too small, the tax exemption cannot apply under 
this framework.
57
 This approach stems from the belief that the community, 
rather than one class of people, should be benefiting from tax-exempt 
organizations.
58
 Yet, while advocates of this approach laud its simplicity 
and supposedly straightforward enforcement, critics counter by noting that 
the effects and endeavors of tax-exempt organizations are difficult to 
define and quantify.
59
 It becomes exceedingly difficult to draw a line in 
determining where the impact of the efforts undertaken by a tax-exempt 
organization ends, especially for universities.
60
 As a result, this approach 
cannot apply to educational institutions because schools are involved in 
diverse, overlapping activities with wide-ranging impacts.
61
 It is unclear 
when a school’s benefits stops applying solely to its students and affects 
its entire community.
62
  
 
 
 53. Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and 
Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 577 (2000). See also Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of 
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980). This understanding has also received judicial 
recognition. See also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 585 
(1997). 
 54. Colombo, supra note 1, at 850. There have been multiple instances of people pursuing 
litigation over unfair benefits given to the leaders of tax-exempt organizations. See, e.g., Harding 
Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1078 (6th Cir. 1974) (illustrating an example of rent 
advantages given to an entity’s officers). 
 55. Colombo, supra note 1, at 850–51. 
 56. Id. at 850. 
 57. For example, an organization disseminated information through a newsletter and engaged in 
litigation to protect the finances for a teachers' retirement system. Id. at 851 (citing Retired Teachers 
Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 280 (1982)). The court decided that the entity was not 
exempt because it primarily served the private interests of its members, the teachers, rather than the 
community at large. See id. 
 58. Colombo, supra note 1, at 850–51. 
 59. See id. at 851 (exemplifying the trouble courts have had in trying to quantify the effects of a 
particular action). 
 60. See id. at 851. 
 61. Universities are “engaged in ‘training the individual,’” which many consider to be “too 
private” of an activity for community benefit. Id. For example, liberal arts students may not 
necessarily use the education that they get in school to directly benefit the community. Their training 
in research and analysis may be tangentially useful but it is difficult to determine what extent the 
education from school actually played a role in their contributions. Thus, the inurement/private benefit 
approach suffers from the inability to create clear distinctions utilizing quantifiable factors. See id.  
 62. See id. 
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Thus, meeting both components of the inurement/private benefit 
approach is difficult to accomplish. Adherence relies too heavily on 
immeasurable factors and ambiguous guidelines, failing to adequately 
describe what can constitute education.
63
 
B. Public Policy Approach 
The second framework is the public policy approach, which is outlined 
in Bob Jones University v. United States.
64
 In this case, the Supreme Court 
held that “an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public 
purpose and not be contrary to established public policy,” meaning that the 
organization should further a community cause so that it does not 
undermine the conferral of any benefits to society.
65
 Applying this 
approach, the Court decided that racially discriminatory admissions 
policies were sufficiently against the public interest, which justified the 
university losing its tax exemption.
66
 Yet, even the Supreme Court 
recognized that this standard would be difficult to apply in more 
ambiguous situations.
67
 It declared that denying an institution a tax 
exemption can be done “only where there can be no doubt that the activity 
involved is contrary to a fundamental public policy.”68 Thus, this 
framework suffers from a similar vagueness problem as the 
inurement/public benefit standard. 
Proponents of this approach highlight its noble virtues and valiant 
moral efforts; however, they fail to acknowledge its limited applications.
69
 
While some public policy concerns can involve inimical practices or 
standards, such as racial discrimination or segregation,
70
 that society 
largely agrees to reject, other disputes could arise where people differ in 
opinion regarding the severity of the issue, making it difficult to decide 
 
 
 63. Id. at 851. 
 64. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 65. Id. at 586. Though this case outlines a framework for determining the allowance of a tax 
exemption, it is also often cited as a First Amendment case because it addresses whether a religious 
university is allowed to enforce racially discriminatory policies for admissions. See generally id. at 
602–604. This Note will not address any of the free exercise of the First Amendment concerns 
presented by this case.  
 66. Id. at 591–96. 
 67. See id. at 592 (recognizing that the “charitable” designation is a “sensitive matter[]” that can 
present significant ambiguity). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Colombo, supra note 1, at 854–55 (enumerating examples of ambiguity). 
 70. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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which actions actually serve a helpful public purpose.
71
 For example, all-
girls colleges could potentially fail to meet this standard for serving a 
public policy because, regardless of any of their other attributes or 
qualities as institutions, they do not admit men and some officials could 
see this as an unjust practice and seek to deny a tax exemption.
72
 
Furthermore, some commentators fear that this line of reasoning could be 
extended, given its inherent ambiguity, to designate extreme or simply 
unpopular philosophies as contrary to public policy, even though the 
inclusion of these fringe ideas is necessary for the continuation of an open, 
diverse society.
73
 Thus, if the public policy approach is followed, the 
Internal Revenue Service would have a tremendous, undue amount of 
power in determining which ideas should be proliferated via its decisions 
in allotting tax exemptions to institutions.
74
 
C. Methodology Approach 
Third, some courts employ the methodology approach to determine if 
an educational institution advocates a particular viewpoint without 
offering information on contrary opinions, which, if applicable, would 
disqualify it as a tax-exempt entity.
75
 There are four factors that courts will 
consider when utilizing this approach:  
(1) whether the presentation of viewpoints unsupported by a 
relevant factual basis constitutes a significant portion of the 
organization’s communications; (2) whether, to the extent 
viewpoints purport to be supported by a factual basis, the facts are 
 
 
 71. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 592 (showing segregation as an example of behavior that is 
contrary to the enforcement of justice); see also Colombo, supra note 1, at 854–55. 
 72. Most courts have held that gender discrimination, particularly in non-educational cases, is not 
a sufficient basis for denying an organization a tax exemption though. Colombo, supra note 1, at 855; 
see, e.g., Junior Chamber of Commerce, Inc., v. U.S. Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974). 
 73. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 606–11 (Powell, J., concurring).  
 74. Many commentators believe that the Internal Revenue Service already has too much 
discretion in determining which fringe viewpoints are too extreme for consideration. “For example, the 
IRS uses a public policy analysis in determining whether demonstrations, economic boycotts, strikes 
and picketing are permissible activities by charitable organizations.” Colombo, supra note 1, at 855 
n.89. 
 75. Id. at 851. This test does not have widespread following or approval within the court system. 
See, e.g., Nat’l Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983). To qualify for a tax 
exemption under the methodology test approach, advocacy groups, including educational institutions, 
must present “a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or 
the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion” because “an organization is not educational 
if its principal function is the mere presentation of unsupported opinion.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(3)(i) (2008).  
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distorted; (3) whether the organization makes substantial use of 
particularly inflammatory and disparaging terms, and expresses 
conclusions based more on emotional feelings than on objective 
factual evaluations; and (4) whether the approach to a subject matter 
is aimed at developing an understanding on the part of the 
addressees, by considering the extent of their prior background or 
training.
76
 
By weighing these four components, courts essentially attempt to 
determine whether an institution is educational based predominantly on its 
conduct.
77
 This framework can be helpful when applied to advocacy 
groups,
78
 but it is not as useful in relation to universities. Similar to the 
other frameworks, the methodology test is based on the unquantifiable 
measure of behavior, making it especially difficult to apply to schools.
79
 
Universities are premised on the notion of teaching students about all 
different types of ideas and philosophies, many of which are new or 
unsubstantiated, and the line between educating and advocating can easily 
become blurred.
80
 Thus, implementing the methodology test could force 
universities to curtail discussions on new or novel concepts to ensure that 
none get any special or unequal treatment compared to others.
81
 Yet, one 
of the foremost goals of universities is to cultivate ideas and limiting the 
discussion of any concepts could hinder this purpose.
82
 Thus, the lack of 
objective criteria similarly hinders the usage of the methodology test 
approach.
83
  
 
 
 76. Tommy F. Thompson, The Availability of the Federal Educational Tax Exemption for 
Propaganda Organizations, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 505–06 (1985); see also Big Mama Rag, Inc. 
v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Jeffrey I. Tilden, Note, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry 
into Vagueness, 67 VA. L. REV. 1543 (1981). 
 77. See Colombo, supra note 1, at 852. 
 78. The Internal Revenue Service used this approach to deny a tax exemption to an organization 
that openly advocated for a race war, which was not conduct the Service wanted to support. See 
generally Nat’l Alliance, 710 F.2d at 868. 
 79. See Colombo, supra note 1, at 853. 
 80. See id. Additionally, “[m]ore than a few educators, in fact, view the noblest purpose of 
universities as nurturing unpopular ideas that may, at least in the beginning, have little factual 
foundation.” Id. 
 81. See id. (noting that the discussion of various points of view is “an inherent part of the 
democratic process”). 
 82. See id. (emphasizing the difficult distinctions schools may be forced to make in defining 
activities). 
 83. Id. 
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D. Commerciality Approach 
The final framework is the commerciality approach.
84
 Arising from an 
“interpretation of the exemption requirement that an organization pursue 
exclusively a charitable purpose,” this framework essentially looks at tax-
exempt organizations, including educational institutions, as if they were 
businesses that provide charitable services.
85
 Known as the “primary 
purpose” test, if an organization is effectively running as a for-profit 
business, which is a decision made by the Internal Revenue Service, its tax 
exemption can be denied.
86
 Thus, an organization with a trade or business 
can be tax-exempt so long as the enterprise is “insubstantial” or “in 
furtherance of the organization’s exempt purpose.”87 This requirement 
reinforces the notion that schools are meant to be educational rather than 
for-profit because it inherently attempts to detach money from education.
88
 
The other approaches do not recognize such a separation.
89
  
Furthermore, the use of profits provides a quantifiable measure of how 
big a particular endeavor within a university is.
90
 Critics of this approach 
claim that it is too nebulous to be uniformly applied to tax-exempt 
institutions.
91
 Yet, this concern can be remedied by having lawmakers 
establish an amount of revenue money, either a percentage or an absolute 
dollar total, which would demarcate an institution as commercial rather 
than educational (discussed in Part V). If there were too much expense or 
funding being attributed to a for-profit venture, the educational institution 
 
 
 84. Id. at 848. 
 85. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 86. Colombo, supra note 1, at 848. 
 87. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c), (e) (2008). To date, many of the organizations that have been 
denied tax exemptions by the Internal Revenue Service under this approach lost the benefit because 
they were deemed to be commercial publishers. Colombo, supra note 1, at 848. For example, an 
organization that published Biblical teaching materials for classes was deemed to be operating 
primarily for profit. Id. (citing Scripture Press Found. vs. United States, 285 F.2d 800, 805–06 (Ct. Cl. 
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962)). Based on its activity, it appeared that education was only 
secondary to the group’s mission, which disqualified it as a tax-exempt organization. Id. Publishing, 
however, has not been the only activity that can prohibit an educational institution from receiving a tax 
exemption. An organization that facilitates educational pursuits such as seminars and lectures was 
denied tax-exempt status because it was “part of a franchise system which is operated for private 
benefit and its affiliation with this system taints it with a substantial commercial purpose.” Id. at 848–
49 (quoting Est. of Haw. v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 1067, 1080 (1979), aff’d, 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
The appearance of an educational institution was only a facade because the court deemed the 
organization to be simply one part of a larger for-profit entity. Id. 
 88. See Colombo, supra note 1, at 848–49 (noting that “an organization pursue exclusively a 
charitable purpose” to receive a tax exemption). 
 89. See id. at 850–55. 
 90. See id. at 848. 
 91. See id. at 849. 
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would accordingly be denied a tax exemption. Therefore, the 
commerciality approach provides a useful mechanism for evaluating the 
legitimacy of the tax exemptions granted to universities.
92
 
Given the monumental scope, expansive contributions, and extensive 
services that contemporary universities provide to their students, 
communities, and the world around them, it is necessary to assess schools’ 
tax exemptions in consideration of their commerciality because their 
multiple profit-generating enterprises suggest that these institutions are not 
focused primarily on educational endeavors.  
IV. ANALYSIS 
Under the commerciality approach, § 501(c)(3) should not include 
universities as tax-exempt “educational institutions” because schools 
generate significant profits and endeavor to create business relationships in 
industries unrelated to education.
93
 Contemporary colleges have become 
multi-faceted behemoths that engage in activities unrelated, or, at best, 
loosely related, to their supposed educational missions.
94
 Thus, upon 
investigation, it becomes clear that universities are more akin to businesses 
than educational entities.
95
 
A. Athletics 
First, the existence of the highly profitable marketing monolith known 
as “college athletics” casts doubt on the inclusion of many schools as 
educational institutions under § 501(c)(3).
96
 Perhaps one of the most 
visible components of some universities, especially Division I
97
 schools, 
 
 
 92. See Daniel Shaviro, From Big Mama Rag to National Geographic: The Controversy 
Regarding Exemptions for Educational Publications, 41 TAX L. REV. 693, 722–28 (1986). There are 
multiple positives and pitfalls regarding the commerciality approach, which will be investigated in the 
following section. 
 93. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 94. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of the University’s 
Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 764 (2004) (reviewing DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE 
MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003)). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Peter D. Blumberg, Comment, From “Publish or Perish” to “Profit or Perish”: Revenues 
from University Technology Transfer and the § 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 89, 109–
10 (1996). See also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 97. In college sports, schools are monitored by the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA), which regulates competition between universities to ensure that they are fair. One of the 
organization’s main oversight functions is to ensure that students do not receive financial incentives 
from schools or outside benefactors to play for a particular institution. The NCAA’s stated goal “is to 
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/9
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college sports not only attract students to its campus but also generate 
tremendous amounts of money.
98
 Throughout an entire season, a top-tier 
athletic program can generate millions of dollars in revenue stemming 
from sources such as ticket sales, concessions, television broadcasting 
rights, and advertisements.
99
 Division I schools focus significant amounts 
of attention on strengthening their athletic programs, sometimes making 
budget cuts in academic areas to secure funding.
100
 Even during economic 
recessions, money is continually found to ensure that a school’s athletic 
teams have the necessary resources to play their games.
101
  
 
 
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between 
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.” Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: 
Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 209–10 (1990) (citing 1989–
90 NCAA MANUAL 1 (1989)). Thus, the NCAA does not want student-athletes to forsake their 
education by receiving payment for playing sports. See id. 
 In furtherance of this goal, the NCAA splits universities into three different categories: Division I, 
Division II, and Division III. Bigger schools’ sports teams, typically large state universities, are placed 
in Division I while smaller schools’ athletic programs, usually liberal arts institutions, are labeled as 
Division III. Division II is an intermediary designation. These labels are based largely on how 
competitive the school desires to be in athletic contests, which is often a function of how much money 
it assigns to its sports programs. Division I schools allocate more money to their teams, specifically in 
the form of athletic scholarships to students. This allotment of funds enables Division I schools to 
obtain higher caliber recruits to participate in their programs. As Division I schools typically attract the 
best athletes, this effort translates to increased competition and higher quality play on the field. 
Consequently, games generate additional media attention and tremendous opportunities for schools to 
profit from home games against other competitive schools, especially for football and basketball 
games. Thus, the tremendous revenue that schools derive from marketing their players and important 
games, such as matches between rival institutions or even managing parking facilities on game day, 
seems to be unrelated to the educational institution tax exemption. See generally id.; see also 
Blumberg, supra note 96, at 110. 
 98. Blumberg, supra note 96, at 110. 
 99. For example, Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio, a Division I school that has 
historically allotted tremendous amounts of money and attention to its athletic programs, can generate 
over $50 million in revenue during its football season when it has eight games played at its home 
arena, Ohio Stadium (also known as “the Horseshoe”). Kristi Dosh, A Close Look at Ohio State’s 
Football Revenue, FORBES.COM (May 31, 2011, 4:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
sportsmoney/2011/05/31/a-close-look-at-ohio-states-football-revenue/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
EG8K-DWUE. Even for such a large school like Ohio State, this amount of money constitutes a 
tremendous amount of revenue that is unrelated to education but is still included under the school’s tax 
exemption. See Blumberg, supra note 96, at 109–10. Similarly, the 2008 NCAA men’s basketball 
tournament generated approximately $143 million in revenue for college and university athletic 
departments throughout the country. Christopher L. Tazzi, Note, To Tax, or Not to Tax, That is the 
Question: Searching for a Solution to the Increasing Commercialization of Intercollegiate Athletics, 
38 J.C. & U.L. 381, 387 (2012) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX PREFERENCES FOR COLLEGIATE 
SPORTS vii (2009)). 
 100. See Koltko, supra note 9, at 1076. 
 101. For example, in early 2009, only a few months after the beginning of one of America’s most 
significant economic recessions, the University of Kentucky invested “$32 million in a well-traveled 
but highly successful basketball coach” even after the state was forced to “cut $20 million in aid to the 
university, and . . . its trustees voted to cut 15 staff members and eliminate 170 unfilled jobs.” Joshua 
Rhett Miller, Cash Strapped States Pay Millions for Basketball Coaches, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 2, 
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As a result, many observers believe that these schools are not only 
focusing more attention on athletics than academics, but also that 
universities are managing this tremendous source of revenue as a 
commercial enterprise,
102
 overshadowing the university’s obligation to 
prioritize educational endeavors for its student body. This is substantiated 
by the fact that most “funds from the revenue producing sports go to 
athletic departments rather than academic budgets.”103 Thus, the university 
effectively runs a semi-professional, commercial sports enterprise that 
would otherwise be taxed because it is generating a profit for the school; 
however, because the endeavor happens to be run through a university, it 
instead receives a tax exemption.
104
 Observers find this discrepancy tough 
to justify, which has led universities to scramble to substantiate their tax 
exemptions.
105
 
One justification that schools have used for their large sports programs 
is labeling the athletic activities as a type of physical education; however, 
this argument fails to consider the reality of the modern universities.
106
 
Colleges argue that students with majors which require that they partake in 
some form of physical activity utilize the facilities, allowing schools to 
claim that there is an academic purpose for the buildings.
107
 Yet, this 
 
 
2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/04/02/cash-strapped-states-pay-millions-for-basketball-
coaches/, archived at http://perma.cc/QJ4C-4LZK. This was also coupled with a five percent increase 
in tuition for students. Id. Though this salary, worth “more than 35 times what the governor earns,” is 
funded significantly by revenue from media and advertisement sales broadcasted during their games, 
the state still contributes a significant amount of money to pay for the coach. Id. 
 102. See Lieberwitz, supra note 94, at 789. One of the biggest concerns surrounding Division I 
sports is that the schools are essentially becoming farm systems to provide training for potential future 
professional athletes, particularly for the National Football League and National Basketball 
Association. Id. Essentially, students can play for a school to hone their skills until they are eligible to 
play at the professional level. Meanwhile, the university can market and hype the student to increase 
ticket sales, helping both the school and the athlete. Division I competitors are given a venue to 
demonstrate their skills to professional sports scouts while the school can market the athlete, such as 
selling sports paraphernalia, to generate revenue. Yet, there seems to be no connection to academics in 
this symbiotic relationship. See id. 
 103. Goldman, supra note 97, at 248. 
 104. Professional sports teams, which are largely analogous commercial entities except that their 
players are paid, do not receive tax exemptions. For example, the 32 teams in the National Football 
League, which make $9 billion annually, are not tax-exempt. Bill Briggs, Legal Procedure: Critics 
Cry Foul as NFL Defends Nonprofit Status, NBCNEWS.COM (Oct. 27, 2013, 4:41 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/legal-procedure-critics-cry-foul-nfl-defends-nonprofit-
status-f8C11412804, archived at http://perma.cc/MN8B-Z3BF. 
 105. See generally Goldman, supra note 97. 
 106. See, e.g., Trs. of Ind. Univ. v. Town of Rhine, 488 N.W.2d 128 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).  
 107. A student-athlete is defined as “one who engages in a particular sport for the educational, 
physical, mental and social benefits derived therefrom and for whom participation in that sport is an 
avocation.” Goldman, supra note 97, at 210 n.38 (citing 1989–90 NCAA MANUAL 82–83 (1989)). On 
the other hand, some schools offer majors in physical education unrelated to actually competing on a 
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2015] EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1071 
 
 
 
 
contention fails to consider the typical usages of many athletic facilities.
108
 
For example, football stadiums are predominantly used for practices and 
home games (which only occur on five or six weekends during the entire 
year).
109
 Furthermore, universities often rent these buildings out to people 
who are not students at the school.
110
 Thus, even though the athletic 
facilities could have some inherent educational value for students with 
specialized, kinesiological majors, such as physical education, in practice 
these buildings do not have extensive non-commercial applications, 
demonstrating that contemporary universities are not purely educational 
entities.  
B. Research 
One of the foremost functions of a university is the promulgation of 
research advances and developments, typically in the sciences.
111
 Yet, this 
endeavor has also historically created one of the biggest commercial 
enterprises from which a school can generate money.
112
 With access to 
tremendous amounts of scientific equipment and resources, especially as 
new and more sophisticated technology rapidly started to develop during 
the mid-20th century, universities began “accepting large sums [of money] 
from the firms that were interested in receiving scientific help in their own 
research projects . . . [which] also enabled science professors to find ways 
to supplement their professorial income with lucrative activities on the 
side.”113 This was a mutually beneficial relationship as university 
employees received funding to continue working on the forefront of 
scientific development while the companies could use the labor to obtain 
 
 
school sports team. This includes classes in kinesiology, marketing, and biology. See, e.g., Physical 
Education Major, DEPAUL UNIVERSITY, http://www.depaul.edu/academics/undergraduate/majors/ 
Pages/physed.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/CG3B-FEYK. 
 108. See Goldman, supra note 97, at 248. Stadiums are often used by schools’ athletic 
departments as a means to entice and attract prospective student-athletes to choose their team. See id. 
A luxury stadium is potentially a useful factor to be used distinguishing schools from each other. Id. 
 109. See id. (emphasizing the exorbitant costs which can go into the facilities for college athletics 
coupled with their limited use). Every game on a college football team's schedule is not played in their 
home stadium. Thus, when the team is traveling to face an opponent the stadium is not in use. 
 110. Often, the people seeking to rent out school facilities are university alumni. In addition, the 
money generated from these rentals will occasionally be used to finance maintenance and upkeep of 
the building or field; however, the usage is still not educational in nature for students because it is, at 
its core, a profit-generating use of the facility, making this usage suspect at best regarding its inclusion 
in validating a school’s tax-exempt status. See, e.g., Trs. of Ind. Univ., 488 N.W.2d at 129. 
 111. See Beach, supra note 11, at 319 (noting that one of a university’s main purposes is to pursue 
“education and research for the general public’s benefit”). 
 112. See Koltko, supra note 9, at 1076–78. 
 113. Id. at 1077. 
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novel products to market.
114
 As a result, schools began patenting their 
ideas and inventions, leading to the implementation of the Bayh-Dole 
Act
115
 in 1980.
116
 Essentially, this legislation simplifies the process for 
colleges to obtain patents and collect royalties and licensing fees from 
their creations.
117
  
Thus, because schools were becoming more involved in commercial 
research, the goal of the legislation “was to encourage participation of 
businesses in academic research as well as to stimulate cooperation 
between commercial entities and, among others, universities.”118 Ideally, 
this research would be conducted in an educational manner that could be 
used to teach university students with the collateral benefit of creating 
patentable ideas or products; however, this legislation has instead led to 
rampant commercialization, which generates tremendous revenue for the 
school separate from its educational mission.
119
 Given the significant 
amount of money colleges derive from the research deals, it is difficult to 
look at these enterprises as purely educational in nature, especially as the 
number of patent applications for universities has significantly increased 
since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.
120
 
For example, in 1989, Harvard University agreed to an $85 million 
offer from the Shiseido Company,
121
 a leading Japanese skincare 
business, for the exclusive right to sell health and beauty products 
developed by Harvard scientists.
122
 The deal did not mention educational 
 
 
 114. See id. (highlighting the mutually beneficial relationship between research companies and 
universities). 
 115. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006). The statute explains that its goal is “to promote collaboration 
between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities; to ensure that 
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to promote 
free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery.” Id. 
 116. Koltko, supra note 9, at 1077. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1078. 
 119. Id. “[T]he Bayh-Dole Act was instrumental in encouraging universities to commercialize 
their research through contracts with industry, including the exclusive licensing of university-owned 
patents to for-profit corporations.” Lieberwitz, supra note 94, at 780. 
 120. Koltko, supra note 9, at 1078. For example, “[i]n the fiscal year 2000, universities filed 8,534 
patents—a 300% increase from 1980; royalties increased by 520%. By the end of year 2005, a total of 
48,612 utility patents were granted to U.S. colleges and universities.” Id.; see also U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES—UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR 
YEARS 1969–2012, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/cls_gr/all_ 
univ_clg.htm (last modified Mar. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/44JF-RABP (listing the 
number of utility patents assigned to American colleges and universities annually). 
 121. See SHISEIDO, http://www.shiseido.com/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). Shiseido is one of the 
world’s leading skincare companies with sales over three billion dollars annually. Koltko, supra note 
9, at 1079 n.41. 
 122. Koltko, supra note 9, at 1079–80. 
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prerogatives for students.
123
 Similarly, “[i]n 2007, Berkeley signed a ten-
year contract with BP, establishing an Energy Bioscience Institute with the 
purpose of developing safer biofuels and discovering alternative energy 
. . . worth $500 million.”124 Over time, these types of research deals 
between companies and universities have become exceedingly 
commonplace.
125
 Thus, it appears that many schools have been “cashing 
in” on research funding and royalties from these deals.126 
Yet, these research agreements seem to contravene the primary purpose 
of universities, which is to educate its students.
127
 Contemporary colleges 
cannot be educational institutions as defined by § 501(c)(3) because their 
academic values are often compromised by the research contracts they 
make with companies.
128
 For example, some of these deals require 
“‘excessive secrecy,’ permitting corporate influence over research 
findings, or providing for publication delays of more than three months 
after completion of research,” which goes against the aforementioned 
ideals of an educational institution.
129
 Furthermore, university 
collaboration with companies gives businesses an enhanced ability to 
determine the research agendas in school laboratories.
130
 Often, a 
component of these agreements is that the corporation may appoint a 
representative to join to university research committee, which not only 
grants that representative access to the school’s facilities, but can also 
sometimes entitle that person to help select faculty proposals for funding 
grants.
131
 As a result, these “partnerships” give commercial companies a 
significant, noticeable presence in university research leadership and 
facilities, questioning the non-profit status of these colleges.
132
  
 
 
 123. See Steven R. Weisman, Harvard and Japanese Cosmetics Maker Join in Skin Research, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1989, at A8.  
 124. Koltko, supra note 9, at 1080. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Bello, supra note 2, at 624. 
 127. See Beach, supra note 11, at 319 (stating that a university's “purposes are education and 
research for the general public's benefit”). 
 128. Lieberwitz, supra note 94, at 786–87. 
 129. Id. at 787 (citations omitted). 
 130. Id. at 788. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. There are multiple instances of universities partnering with companies to generate 
products for the marketplace. For example, “the 1982 Washington University-Monsanto agreement for 
$23.5 million of corporate funding over five years in exchange for exclusive licensing rights to patents 
resulting from the biomedical research” as well as “the 1997 MIT-Merck agreement for $15 million of 
corporate funding over five years in exchange for licensing rights to resulting patents” demonstrate 
schools working with businesses in a deal likely to result in a profit. Id.  
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Thus, if schools are seeking to make money from these agreements, it 
is counterintuitive to offer them tax exemptions for being a non-profit and 
to provide them with an unfair competitive advantage over other 
companies that are in the research and development industry.
133
 These 
agreements have come to represent “a symbiotic relationship between 
academia and industry,” demonstrating that these schools have a striking 
resemblance to businesses, rather than educational institutions, that 
disqualify them from tax exemptions under § 501(c)(3).
134
  
C. University Bookstores and Miscellaneous Other Commercial Ventures 
While athletics and research have an arguably tangential connection to 
academia, universities often engage in activities that are solely intended to 
market the school’s brand name.135 These endeavors lack any connection 
to academic pursuits, but they still receive the same tax treatment as if they 
were educational in nature.
136
 One of the most conspicuous examples of 
such commercialism is a university bookstore.
137
 
Often, campus bookstores are owned and operated by private 
companies, or these shops negotiate deals with universities whereby they 
can utilize the university’s brand name or logo to attract customers.138 The 
stores usually do not exclusively sell academic materials, such as 
textbooks.
139
 Clothing, coffee mugs, and other merchandise with a 
 
 
 133. Id. at 792 n.213. 
 134. Koltko, supra note 9, at 1082. 
 135. See James Piereson & Naomi Schaefer Riley, Opinion, Why Shouldn’t Princeton Pay Taxes?, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2013, 7:16 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732347760 
4579001294219967488.html (listing for-profit activities universities can engage in). Many 
administrators even admit that their universities’ involvement in commercial enterprises lacks even the 
facade of academic interest. These efforts are driven by monetary concerns that the university fiercely 
protects. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Colombo, supra note 1, at 849. Furthermore, “[i]f the focus of the commerciality doctrine is 
that goods and services provided by for-profit businesses are not appropriate subjects for tax-
exemption, then any activity in an area populated by for-profit enterprise ought to lose exemption.” Id. 
Yet the fact that this is not the law shows the lack of uniformity in enforcement of tax exemptions for 
universities. Id. 
 138. For example, Barnes and Noble, a large book retailer, has agreements in place to operate 
nearly 700 stores at various universities throughout the United States. College Partners, BARNES & 
NOBLE COLLEGE, http://www.bncollege.com/college-partners/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/X6QX-TQ2P. They “serve almost 4.5 million students and over 250,000 faculty 
members” under the umbrella of the local school. Id.; see also Colombo, supra note 1, at 849. 
 139. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii) (2009). In these cases, “casual sales in the course of such 
activity which do not qualify as related to the exempt function involved” will not be treated as a 
regular activity that would substantiate a tax break. Id.; see generally Stanford Univ. Book Store v. 
Helvering, 83 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1936). 
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school’s name on it are commonplace purchases that generate tremendous 
amounts of profit for the store.
140
 Yet, because they are operating as part of 
the school, the company can qualify for tax exemptions.
141
 Many 
municipalities, however, have sought to prevent or curtail these tax 
benefits from being bestowed on private businesses.
142
 Instead of pursuing 
litigation, many college towns have reached settlement agreements with 
campus bookstores, forcing the businesses to limit the tax benefits they get 
from their university affiliations.
143
 Therefore, the commercial nature of 
these endeavors is apparent while connections to educational pursuits 
seem to be missing.
144
 
Other pieces of property with only tangential connections to education 
and the university, such as presidential mansions
145
 or fraternities,
146
 
additionally substantiate the argument that schools are commercial 
entities. Universities, have also acquired or inherited commercial 
businesses with no ostensible connection to academics.
147
 Many of these 
companies would be able to function independently.
148
 Yet, by managing 
these enterprises, schools enable tax exemptions that yield a significant 
competitive advantage over others in the marketplace.
149
 As a result, there 
 
 
 140. Companies will often “license the use of the universities’ names in order to put them on 
sweatshirts, mugs, and other paraphernalia and sell them . . . at the campus bookstores. This technique 
proved to be of great significance in raising revenue . . . that universities’ bookstores give better 
shelving to trifling memorabilia than to academic publications.” Koltko, supra note 9, at 1082 n.57 
(citation omitted). Furthermore, “[s]imilar to Chanel and Dior, universities such as Oxford, Harvard, 
Yale, New York University, etc. have become ‘couture’ in the sphere of education,” meaning 
companies can generate a lot of money from aggressive marketing of merchandise featuring a school’s 
logo. Id. at 1082.  
 141. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).  
 142. For example, Syracuse University reached a settlement agreement with the city of Syracuse 
to avoid litigation regarding the tax status of its bookstore. See Ryan Delaney, Syracuse OK’s 30-Year 
Tax Break for University Bookstore, INNOVATIONTRAIL (July 9, 2012, 7:31 PM), http://innovationtrail. 
org/post/syracuse-oks-30-year-tax-break-university-bookstore, archived at http://perma.cc/VW8T-
W4F3. 
 143. See, e.g., id.; see also Piereson and Riley, supra note 135. 
 144. See Delaney, supra note 142; Piereson and Riley, supra note 135. 
 145. See, e.g., Trs. of Boston Univ. v. Bd. of Assessors of Brookline, 416 N.E.2d 510 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1981). 
 146. See Colombo, supra note 1, at 858 n.103. 
 147. See id. at 849 (noting the difficulty in drawing the line between a business and a tax-exempt 
organization because "a number of activities in the educational area clearly are capable of being run as 
stand-alone businesses"). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (1982). 
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is inherent unfairness and no horizontal equity
150
 between competitors in 
the same industry.
151
  
For example, in 1948, the New York University School of Law (“NYU 
Law”) bought the C.F. Mueller Company (“Mueller Macaroni”) with its 
own funds and contributions from wealthy alumni in an agreement that 
dictated the school would manage the business and consequently receive 
any profits it generates.
152
 NYU Law hoped that its purchase would 
provide the school with additional funds to enable it to expand and 
flourish.
153
 As a result, for nearly thirty years until the company was sold 
in 1976,
154
 NYU Law was a successful competitor in the pasta industry in 
addition to its academic pursuits.
155
 Initially, the tax exemption for the 
operation of the pasta company was upheld,
156
 but such generous inclusion 
has since been limited to include only a school’s more “related” business 
ventures.
157
 Again, this nebulous term has been widely applied since its 
implementation to cover many different facets of university 
undertakings.
158
 Schools still “continue to sell housing and meals, perform 
contract research and testing, and operate publishing houses” as well 
generate tremendous revenue from sporting events.
159
 Though university 
endeavors are typically no longer quite as markedly unrelated to academia 
as pasta production, enterprises such as bookstores, fraternities, 
presidential mansions, dormitories, and many other campus installations 
exist with tax exemptions intended for educational institutions despite the 
 
 
 150. Id. at 1019 n.14 (“Horizontal equity is the principle that taxes should be equal for entities in 
equal positions.”). In practice, this argument contends that businesses in the same industry should have 
equal tax treatment, prohibiting any additional, unfair advantages for one business against its 
competitors in the same industry.  
 151. Id. at 1020. 
 152. Id. at 1017; see also John Brooks, The Marts of Trade: The Law School and the Noodle 
Factory, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 26, 1977, at 48. Specifically, the agreement outlined that “no part of 
[Mueller Macaroni’s] income or property shall inure to the private benefit of any stockholder . . . other 
than New York University for the exclusive benefit of its School of Law.” Id. Furthermore, the law 
school sought to keep the money only for itself, rather than let the central university utilize any of the 
funds too, because the company was so profitable. See id. at 49. 
 153. See id. at 48 (noting that the law school used the funds to construct a new building for its 
campus).  
 154. See id. at 50–53. 
 155. See id. at 48–49. 
 156. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951). The court believed that, as the 
law stood at the time, NYU Law was allowed to include Mueller Macaroni within its tax exemption. 
Id. at 122–23.  
 157. See Revenue Act of 1950, I.R.C. §§ 502–14 (2012). See also Boris I. Bittker & George K. 
Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 
318–19 (1976). 
 158. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 149, at 1017–18. 
 159. Id. at 1018. 
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fact that they have little (or nothing) to do with academics.
 
Thus, to claim 
that contemporary universities are, on the whole, educational institutions 
ignores the reality of the situation surrounding all of the commercial 
enterprises in which schools are involved. While components of a school 
can be educational in nature, the sum of the parts fails to satisfy the 
definition of an “educational institution.”160 
V. HOW TO ENABLE CONTEMPORARY UNIVERSITIES TO QUALIFY AS 
“EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS” 
To appropriately apply tax exemptions to contemporary universities as 
“educational institutions,” the government should utilize the 
commerciality approach instead of any of the other existing frameworks 
because money constitutes a quantifiable measure in which legislators and 
courts can draw a line establishing where a non-profit entity ends and a 
business begins.
161
 Though they both present considerable practical 
concerns, either of two different courses of action can be used to 
implement the commerciality approach and curtail the variance in defining 
an “educational institution.”162  
A. Line of Demarcation 
First, Congress could create an objective, unambiguous dollar or 
percentage (of revenue) amount that, when surpassed, would designate a 
university as a business rather than school.
163
 The core appeal of this 
proposal is its apparent simplicity: if a university is generating more than a 
predetermined amount of money from its daily operations, the school 
would no longer qualify for a tax exemption under § 501(c)(3).
164
 Yet, this 
approach is limited in its applicability because defining “daily operations” 
presents the same issues as defining an “educational institution.”165 There 
are a seemingly infinite number of components that can constitute a 
school’s daily operations so that enumerating all of them would be 
impossible.
166
 
 
 
 160. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Colombo, supra note 1, at 846–49 (explaining past attempts to separate exempt and non-
exempt university activities). 
 164. See id. at 847–48 (noting that some university activities are occasionally “insubstantial” such 
that they should not affect the school’s tax-exempt status). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. (demonstrating the wide variety and scope of activities that universities are capable of 
providing). 
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Similarly, it would be difficult to determine where the line of 
demarcation should be drawn because of the inherent variations in type 
and scope of universities throughout the country (even after ignoring all of 
the political posturing and considerations that would inevitably come into 
play).
167
 Accounting for differences in factors such as student body size, 
location, or endowment could lead to disparities or inequities in 
enforcement of tax exemptions.
168
 For example, many liberal arts schools 
have small athletic departments because their sports teams are not as 
popular on campus, and they consequently lack demand from students and 
alumni to expend resources to bolster their programs.
169
 Though smaller 
school athletic teams are still regulated in the same way as their bigger 
counterparts,
170
 factoring their profitability into any equation is unlikely to 
yield fair results when compared to other schools, especially if they are 
only using athletics for educational purposes rather than generating 
revenue.
171
 
B. Fragmentation 
The second possible approach would be to split universities into 
separate entities so that the tax-exempt functions are separate from the 
commercial ones.
172
 “Under an amendment made by the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969, the Internal Revenue Code gives the [Internal Revenue] Service 
authority to ‘fragment’ the activities of an . . . exempt organization.”173 
Essentially, the government has the power to monitor the size of tax-
 
 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. at 849 (suggesting that there could be “inexplicable variations in result[s]” when 
applying the commerciality approach to various entities). 
 169. See Goldman, supra note 97, at 237 (stating that Division I games “attract far greater 
attendance and television ratings than” their Division III counterparts). Furthermore, there is 
tremendous variation in the size of college athletic programs throughout the country, making a 
university’s budget allocation toward its sporting teams a consideration in determining whom a school 
will compete with. See generally id. at 209 n.29. 
 170. Id. at 228 (“[M]any members of the smaller athletic associations are also members of the 
NCAA. Those schools, as well as all schools in NCAA division II and division III, are subject to 
NCAA regulations and control. They cannot offset NCAA power.”). See generally NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 171. Goldman, supra note 97, at 237 (noting the tremendous disparity in attendance at athletic 
events between schools in Division I, II, and III).  
 172. See Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the Professionalization of College 
Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 35, 44–54. 
 173. Id. at 56. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/9
  
 
 
 
 
2015] EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1079 
 
 
 
 
exempt entities and split them if they become too big or cumbersome.
174
 In 
relation to universities, this adjustment would mean creating independent 
corporate units for the schools’ various components, which would most 
likely then be under the supervision of a larger administrative entity.
175
 
Many universities have already begun to comply with the bureaucratic 
changes necessitated by the fragmentation approach.
176
  
Although many colleges’ athletic departments carry on their routine 
functions, they are now separate from their schools’ main branches.177 It is 
unlikely, from a practical standpoint, that students or faculty would (or 
even could) know that there has been any change since these technical 
adjustments have only occurred on paper for tax purposes.
178
 Thus, under 
the commerciality approach, this severance would be a valid step toward 
maintaining the integrity of a university as an educational institution 
because the commercial parts of the new entity would no longer be 
directly connected to the educational ones seeking the tax exemptions.
179
  
 
 
 174. See id. (noting that the government has the power to fragment though it has primarily been 
used to prevent entities from diversifying into unrelated business activities in the past). See also I.R.C. 
§ 513(c) (2010). 
 175. Jensen, supra note 172, at 56. From a practical perspective though, most of these changes 
occur only on paper. Id. at 57. Yet, creating separate entities is not the only way to fragment the 
school. It is possible to subdivide any products the school sells. For example, sales at the bookstore 
could be “fragmented into educational and noneducational components” to assess tax consequences of 
each transaction. Id. 
 176. Schools such as the University of Michigan, the University of Georgia, and Stanford 
University, among others, have all incorporated their athletic departments into separate, distinct legal 
entities. See id. at 44 n.38. Furthermore, “[t]hese departments . . . are expected to be economically self-
sufficient, paying their universities for services provided but otherwise making no cash contributions 
that directly affect academic departments.” Id. This creates a discrepancy between the university and 
the money in college sports that is not related to educational pursuits, preserving the basis for the tax 
exemption. 
 177. Id.  
 178. See id. at 56–57 (noting that most of these changes are unnoticeable in practice because they 
are accounting techniques). Similarly, the National Football League (“NFL”) is also currently taking 
advantage of the fragmentation approach. The thirty-two NFL teams are not considered tax-exempt 
organizations; however, the league office, one fragment of the NFL bureaucracy, has been given tax-
exempt status as a nonprofit trade association. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (2010). Thus, the league office, 
which collects membership dues from the teams (which they must pay to be eligible to compete 
against each other under the NFL’s framework and brand) that can collectively result in as much as 
$250 million in revenue, is tax-exempt. As a result, there is little, if any, noticeable effect on the 
product that the NFL is offering, specifically the broadcasting of professional football games, and the 
league office has successfully shielded some of its money from the Internal Revenue Service.  
 On the other hand, given the NFL’s tremendous size and profitability, Congress has been 
considering whether to strip the tax exemption because it does not want to have taxpayer dollars 
subsidizing a commercial sports league. This argument is bolstered by the public’s perception of the 
NFL. Many football fans believe that the NFL already makes enough money (approximately $9 billion 
in a given year) and should not be entitled to a tax exemption that enables it to make even more of a 
profit. See Briggs, supra note 104. 
 179. See Jensen, supra note 172, at 56. 
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Fragmentation, however, can lead to logistical problems that need to be 
resolved to make the approach useful and frugal.
180
 As every product that a 
university creates would potentially need to be labeled as educational or 
non-educational to determine whether the tax exemption applies, there 
could be a tremendous amount of time and transaction costs when 
implementing this system.
181
 Taking this approach to its extreme could 
lead to excessive, unnecessary subdivisions within a school or within a 
school’s products. For example, “the [Internal Revenue] Service has ruled 
that an exempt blood bank’s commercial sales of blood plasma had to be 
further subdivided: plasma acquired for resale generated income from an 
unrelated trade or business, but plasma produced as a by-product of 
providing blood products to hospitals did not.”182 Fortunately, though it 
will not be a simple task, splitting a college into multiple components is 
unlikely to present this logistical nightmare because a university could be 
feasibly split into larger fragments.
183
 
Even though they have some potential, both of these methods present 
substantial problems that would hinder their implementation, 
substantiating the notion that contemporary universities cannot qualify for 
tax exemptions because installing the necessary measures to enable them 
to lawfully obtain such benefits would be practically impossible. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As has been shown throughout this Note, labeling contemporary 
universities as “educational institutions”184 is inappropriate and misguided. 
As colleges have changed from simply groups of people with a shared 
interest to colossal programs on large campuses, they have begun to more 
closely resemble businesses rather than schools. Their expansive scope 
and involvement in profitable enterprises outside of the classroom disables 
their ability to obtain a tax exemption under § 501(c)(3).  
To address the changing nature of contemporary universities, numerous 
frameworks have been offered to help decide whether a school is no longer 
educational in nature. With factors ranging from how a university spends 
its money to the values it espouses, these methods offer varying 
viewpoints of when a school has become a business. Yet, of these 
 
 
 180. See id. at 56–57. 
 181. See id. 
 182. Id. at 56. 
 183. See id. at 55–57 (noting that universities often are involved in large enterprises and expansive 
activities so fragmenting them may not ultimately necessitate such minute distinctions). 
 184. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
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methods, the commerciality approach provides for the most consistent 
analysis. Because it focuses primarily on the amount of money a 
university spends or earns to determine whether the entity is a non-profit 
business, this approach utilizes a quantifiable, objective measure to label a 
school while the other frameworks are mired in subjective criteria that 
cannot be uniformly applied.  
Yet, despite their extensive commercialism, which is fueled 
predominantly by college athletics, research, and bookstores, universities 
may still have the ability to qualify as educational institutions. Multiple 
methods have been created that could divide the profitable components of 
schools from the educational ones. In particular, the line of demarcation 
and fragmentation approaches could enable schools to monitor or separate 
their commercial enterprises from their academic facets, potentially 
preserving the tax exemption for the entity’s educational pursuits. 
Unfortunately, it is doubtful that these methods will be pursued because 
they present inherent logistical problems, which could force schools to 
incur significant costs in implementation. 
Though contemporary universities still aspire to educate their students, 
these efforts have been overshadowed by profitable business ventures and 
partnerships with companies who seek to make money by exploiting 
colleges. Thus, unless the law is changed, universities should no longer 
qualify as educational institutions that warrant a tax exemption under 
§ 501(c)(3). 
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